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Abstract
This paper develops a conceptual framework for analyzing the development of
participation rights in Community administration from the early 1970’s to the present day.
Procedural rights can be divided into three categories, each of which is associated with a distinct
phase in Community history and a particular set of institutional actors. The first set of rights, the
right to a fair hearing when the Commission inflicts sanctions or other forms of hardship on
individuals, first emerged in the 1970's in the context of competition proceedings and later in
areas such as anti-dumping and structural funds. This phase was driven by the Court of Justice
and an English, and to a lesser extent, German conception of the value of a fair hearing. The rise
of transparency in the 1990's-- the requirement of openness in all Community institutions,
including administration--marks the second stage. The drive for transparency was led by certain
member countries with longstanding traditions of open government--the Netherlands, Denmark,
and Sweden--as well as the European Parliament. The most recent phase in the development of
process rights is the debate on whether and under what conditions, individuals, firms, and their
associations, billed "civil society," should take part in Community legislative and rulemaking
proceedings. The Commission and now the Convention on the Future of Europe have been the
keenest proponents of giving citizens and their associations a right to participate in rulemaking
and legislative proceedings.
Civil society participation is then critically examined. Representation--not expertise or
good management practices--is the only justification for allocating power, within the Community
policymaking process, to individual citizens and their organizations. Yet there is no consensus in
Europe, where republican, corporatist, and liberal traditions continue to flourish, on the
legitimacy of representation outside of political parties and the electoral process. Without wider
consensus, I conclude that associational participation in Community policymaking should not be
entrenched and that the Commission should, in mediating the informal influence of civil society
actors, act in awareness of its innate institutional bias toward liberal interest group pluralism.
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Introduction
Representation, delegation and specialization pose enduring problems for democratic
theory because they fly in the face of the simple and central ideal of self-government, the citizen
who at one and the same time governs and is governed. The rise of the administrative state and
the science of policymaking have both increased our complacency in the face of government by
elites and heightened the threat to the republican ideal of the virtuous citizen engaged in the
affairs of the polis. The right to be heard by government administration is one way in which
citizenship has been vindicated--and reinvented--in modern times.
The right to be heard is perhaps even more important in the European Union. Born at the
same time as the administrative state, Europe has never had the luxury of the symbols and
institutions of the nineteenth-century nation state or the eighteenth-century republic. Precisely
because those symbols and institutions are perceived as so critical to the exercise of public
power, Europe's member countries, both their politicians and their peoples, have been reluctant
to vest Europe with a "parliament," "ministers" and a "constitution" for to do so would diminish
the significance of their own parliaments, ministers, and constitutions. Europe, notwithstanding
the Charter on Fundamental Rights, the Convention on the Future of Europe, and other
constitutional developments, governs and will continue to govern through the science of
policymaking.
In this paper, I develop a conceptual framework for analyzing the development of rights
of participation in European Community administrative proceedings from the early 1970's to the
present day.1 My claim is that process rights in Community administration can be divided into
1

I use "procedural rights," "participation rights," and "process rights" interchangeably. For present purposes, the
terms are taken to mean a legal right or emerging institutional practice which enables individuals to influence a
specific administrative determination before a final decision is taken. This includes the following: notification of
proposed administrative action and the rationale for such action, the right to object to the contemplated action, and
administrative consideration of the individual's objections, generally evidenced in a written decision. The reader
should keep in mind that this definition is purely functional and that the normative justifications for allowing
individuals or groups to influence specific administrative determinations vary from area to area. The reader should
also note that procedural rights which are commonly understood as furthering rule of law ideals, such as publication
of final decisions, have been intentionally excluded from the coverage of this paper.
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three categories, each of which is associated with a distinct phase in Community history and a
particular set of institutional actors.2 The first set of rights, the right to a fair hearing when the
Commission inflicts sanctions or other forms of hardship on individuals, first emerged in the
1970's in the context of competition proceedings and later in areas such as anti-dumping and
structural funds. This phase was driven by the Court of Justice and an English, and to a lesser
extent, German conception of the value of a fair hearing. The rise of transparency in the 1990's
marks the second stage in the development of administrative process rights. Although the
transparency principle applies to all of the institutions in all of their activities, it is particularly
relevant to Community administration because it enables individuals and their associations to
follow more closely, and hence influence, the course of administrative decisionmaking. The
drive for transparency was led by certain member countries with longstanding traditions of open
government--the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden--as well as the European Parliament. The
most recent phase in the development of process rights is the debate on whether and under what
conditions, individuals, firms, and their associations, billed "civil society," should take part in
Community legislative and rulemaking proceedings. The Commission and now the Convention
on the Future of Europe have been the keenest proponents of giving citizens and their
associations a right to participate in rulemaking and legislative proceedings. Here I take sides.
Representation--not expertise or good management practices--is the only possible justification
for allocating power, within the Community policymaking process, to individual citizens and
their organizations. Yet there is no consensus in Europe, where republican, corporatist, and

2

In European Community law, the definition of whether an act is "administrative" or "legislative" commonly turns
on whether the determination is aimed at a particular individual or set of individuals or whether it is a generally
applicable rule. While this might be appropriate in national parliamentary systems, where the legislative body
retains some power over so-called "delegated legislation," it is ill-suited to the Community's system of fragmented
sovereignty. I therefore define a Community administrative proceeding as any determination of rights and duties
made individually by the Commission or the Council in furtherance of powers conferred directly by the Treaty
Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) or by secondary legislation. This definition turns on the
exercise of powers in the absence of the full legislative process. It is also important to recognize for purposes of
understanding the true scope of hearing rights that, even though the Commission is the formal author of most
administrative determinations, it acts together with expert committees, comitology committees, and/or European
agencies. The crux of decisionmaking power--Commission officials or national civil servants--varies depending on
the substantive matter under consideration and the personalities involved.
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liberal traditions continue to flourish, on the legitimacy of representation outside of political
parties and the electoral process. Without wider consensus, I conclude that associational
participation in Community policymaking should not be entrenched and that the Commission
should, in mediating the informal influence of civil society actors, act in awareness of its innate
institutional bias toward an extreme form of liberal interest group pluralism.

I. The First Generation: The Right to a Fair Hearing
Procedural rights were first established in Community competition proceedings, one of
the few areas in which the Commission, as opposed to member states, is empowered to directly
impose sanctions or other burdens upon individuals in administering Community law.3 At the
origin of these rights were fundamental fairness concerns, given the analogies to criminal
penalties, together with a distinctly English, and to a lesser extent, German, conception of the
administrative process. The Court of Justice has been the most influential of the Community
institutions in developing these rights. It took the lead in the early 1970's and continues to press
the Commission in its treatment of economic actors. Even when the Commission has acted on
its own initiative, as with a series of administrative rules adopted in the 1980’s and 1990’s, it has
been obviously spurred by the Court and has defined the procedural safeguards through direct
reference to the jurisprudence of the Court.4
3

By competition, I refer only to trade-restrictive agreements, abuse of dominant position, and mergers. I do not
include state aids because there, governments distributing the aid, not individuals, are considered the relevant parties
and therefore individual rights are not as extensively developed. On the more limited procedural rights in state aids
cases, see Case 367/95, Commission v Chambre syndicale nationale des entreprises de transport de fonds et valeurs
(Sytraval), 1998 ECR I-1719 and Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed
rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, 1999 O.J. (L 83) 1.
4
Oral hearings are almost always held in competition proceedings. Under the Commission's rules, the hearing
officer must ensure respect for the principles set down by the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance.
Commission Decision 2001/462 of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of hearing officers in certain competition
proceedings, 2001 O.J. (L 162) 21, art. 3 (replacing earlier decision from 1994). Likewise, the Commission’s rules
on access to case files in competition proceedings were expressly adopted in order to guarantee respect for the
principles set down by the Court. Introduction, Commission Notice on the internal rules of procedure for processing
requests for access to the file in cases pursuant to Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, Articles 65 and 66 of the
ECSC Treaty and Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, 1997 O.J. (C 23) 3. For the most recent rules on hearing
and access to file rights, see Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the
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In most systems of administrative law, notions of fundamental fairness require that the
defendant have the right to vigorously contest administrative determinations which inflict
sanctions or other forms of individual hardship. Nonetheless, the stage at which the defendant
may contest the determination, the forum before which she may vindicate her rights, and the
scope of the rights, differ considerably from one country to another. This is one of the major
fault lines generally believed to separate common law from civil law systems of administrative
law: in the common law, the defendant can challenge the decision before the administration
itself, while in the civil law, she must wait until the administrative process has been completed
and apply to the courts for judicial review.5 The fairness of the administrative act in the English
common law tradition turns on the ability to engage in a quasi-judicial process at the time of its
adoption. This highly procedural conception of rights is tied to the institutional practice of
administrative tribunals, which are charged with making decisions that in other countries would
be made by government ministries, bodies such as the early Railway and Canal Commission, or
which serve as an appeals mechanism within a ministry or agency.6 By contrast, in many
continental administrative law traditions, fairness is guaranteed through the possibility of review
in an independent forum. Individuals have a right to contest an adverse administrative
determination at some point, but not necessarily before the administration deciding on the act.
As Jürgen Schwarze has argued, the Court of Justice came under the influence of English,
and to a lesser extent, German administrative law in viewing fairness as turning on the
procedural rights available to firms in Community competition proceedings rather than on the
relief they could obtain from the Court through judicial review.7 Transocean Marine Paint
Association v. Commission is one of the first in this line of cases and illustrates nicely the way in
which the individual consequences of the Commission’s determination, together with the
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, art. 27.
5
Like all classifications, this one obscures a much richer reality. Until the 1960's, in U.S. administrative law,
judicial review in the courts was often all the process that individuals were allowed, and even after the due process
revolution of the 1970's, this is sometimes still the case.
6
Robert Baldwin & Christopher McCrudden, Regulation and Public Law 17-19 (1987).
7
See Jürgen Schwarze, Judicial Review in EC Law—Some Reflections on the Origins and the Actual Legal
Situation, 51 Int’l Comp. L. Q 17, 21 (2001).
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distinctly English conception of rights, led the Court down the road of proceduralization.8 The
plaintiff, an association of marine paint manufacturers, operated a world-wide sales network for
its members. Transocean notified the network agreement to the Commission, which conditioned
its approval on Transocean’s members disclosing any cross-holding patterns between their
directors and other firms in the paint sector. The Commission imposed the condition without
alerting Transocean in advance of the decision and without giving Transocean the opportunity to
object.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Commission's procedure was perfectly consistent with
the letter of the applicable regulation, the Court held in favor of Transocean based on a “general
rule” that “a person whose interests are perceptibly affected by a decision taken by a public
authority must be given the opportunity to make his point of view known.” The Court further
stated that this general rule was especially applicable "in the case of conditions which, as in this
case, impose considerable obligations having far-reaching effects.”9 It is clear, therefore, that the
Court was motivated by the perception that the Commission's decision would impose significant
burdens on Transocean. But where did this "general rule" come from? The Court itself did not
elaborate on the source of the rule, but it had the benefit of the UK Advocate General’s opinion.
Advocate General Warner concluded that the right to be heard was part of Community law after
an extensive discussion of the English "rule of natural justice" under which “although there are
not positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the
common law will supply the omission of the legislature.”10 The Advocate General also drew
upon the traditions of other member states but remarkably, or perhaps simply with remarkable
frankness, he found that only a minority of member states recognized the rule. In his tally, only
England, Scotland, Denmark, Germany, and Ireland clearly embraced the principle, while
France, Belgium, and Luxembourg were arguably evolving in that direction, and Italy and the
Netherlands clearly rejected it.

8

Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission, 1974 ECR 1063.
Id. at 1080, para. 15.
10
Id. at 1088.
9

5

The Court has expanded the procedural boundaries in competition cases in a number of
other respects.11 The right of access to the Commission’s evidentiary record, a right which
enables economic operators to challenge effectively the Commission's position, was developed
in a line of cases and has culminated in the recognition, by the Commission, of a general right of
access to the file. In early cases such as Beohringer Mannheim,12 ACF Chemiefarma,13 and
Imperial Chemical Industries,14 the Court established the principle that the duty, under the
competition regulations, to allow parties to “make known their views” included the duty to set
forth “the essential facts on which the Commission relies” as well as the duty “in the course of
the administrative procedure [to supply] the details necessary to the defence.” However, in
applying these principles, the Court was quite deferential to the Commission. That changed in
the late 1970's, starting with Hoffman-La Roche. There, the Court departed from the Advocate
General’s opinion: it found that the document alleged to have been improperly withheld was
essential to the defense and carefully examined, fact-by-fact, whether Hoffman La-Roche had
had an opportunity to examine the evidence and respond at some point in the case.15 Moreover,
in the 1980's, the Court recognized a series of limits on the Commission's powers of
investigation, including a privilege for attorney-client communications,16 a privilege against self-

11

See generally Loic Azoulay, The Court of Justice and the Administrative Governance, 7 Eur. L.J. 425 (2001);
Paul Craig & Grainne de Burca, EU Law (3d ed. 2002); R.H. Lauwaars, Rights of Defence in Competition Cases in
II Institutional Dynamics of European Integration 497-509 (Deirdre Curtin & Ton Heukels eds. 1994).
12
Case 45/69, Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities, 1970 ECR 769.
13
Case 41/69, ACF Chemiefarma v. Commission, 1970 ECR 661.
14
Case 48/69, ICI v. Commission, 1972 ECR 619.
15
See Koen Lenaerts & Jan Vanhamme, Procedural Rights of Private Parties in the Community Administrative
Process, 1997 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 531, 545-49. Lenaerts and Vanhamme discuss the developments in the Court
of First Instance on the right of access as well as the Commission’s legislative initiative, in which it codified and
extended the Court’s jurisprudence by establishing a procedure for access to competition files. Commission Notice
97/C 23/03 on the internal rules of procedure for processing requests for access to the file in cases pursuant to Arts.
85 and 86 EC, Arts. 65 and 66 ECSC and Council Reg. (EEC) No. 4064/89, 1997 O.J. (C 23) 3.
16
Case 155/79, Australian Mining and Smelting Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 ECR 1575, para. 23 (covering
communications made between an independent lawyer and a client for the sole purpose of defending the client in the
competition proceeding at issue).
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incrimination, 17and a duty to respect national search warrant requirements and only collect
evidence related to the specific ends of the investigation.18
The procedural principles worked out in the competition area can be summarized as
follows. In gathering evidence at the investigation phase, the Commission must respect national
warrant requirements and limited versions of the attorney-client privilege and privilege against
self-incrimination. At the decisionmaking phase, the Commission must set forth a preliminary
statement of the evidence and the legal conclusions drawn from the evidence (statement of
objections) and the parties have the right to contest the statement, both through access to the file
to scrutinize the evidence and in a written reply in which they rebut the evidence and challenge
the Commission's arguments. An oral hearing is also conducted, presided by an independent
officer, in which the parties have an opportunity to further develop their objections to the
Commission's case. Lastly, an exhaustive written decision, often running hundreds of pages, sets
forth the facts and reasons for the finding of a competition infringement and the resulting
sanction.
Competition proceedings represent the Community Rolls Royce of administrative
adjudication and have influenced the development of procedural rights in other areas of
Community administration.19 In deciding whether to recognize a right to a fair hearing, the
Court examines whether the Commission can impose a “penalty” or “adverse effect”20 on an
individual or a discrete set of individuals. In anti-dumping determinations, the Commission
directly assesses the functional equivalent of a fine--the anti-dumping duty--and thus the Court
17

Case 374/87, Orkem v. Commission, 1989 ECR 3283 (allowing firms to refuse to answer questions that directly
Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst AG v. Commission, 1989 ECR 2859.
19
For a comprehensive overview of this category of rights, see Hans Peter Nehl, Principles of Administrative
Procedure in EC Law (1999).
20
Case C-395/00, Distillerie Fratelli Cipriani SpA v. Ministero delle Finanze, 2002 ECR , para. 51; Case C-48/96,
Windpark Groothusen v. Commission 1998 ECR 2873, para. 47. The Charter of Fundamental Rights establishes a
right to good administration which includes "the right of every person to be heard before any individual measures
which would affect him or her adversely is taken." Art. 41.2. The right to a hearing turns on whether the
Commission act has an adverse effect. The plain meaning could extend to denial of benefits, since, after all, the
decision to apply an import duty, and not grant an exemption, or to deny a research grant to one party and award it to
another, is a measure which adversely affects the disappointed party. Nonetheless, the Court of Justice has always
used the term to mean the imposition of a burden akin to a penalty or sanction and given that the Charter was drafted
18
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was willing, early on, to recognize hearing rights.21 In 1998, the Court found that the right of
defense applies in the customs field when the Commission seeks to recover duties from
importers alleged to have mistakenly or fraudulently benefited from certain exemptions.22 The
Court has sporadically imposed procedural guarantees in other areas: in one case, the exclusion
of a Swedish fishing company from a Community fishery zone because of allegations of illegal
fishing activities was enough to trigger a hearing right23 and in another case, the reduction of
financial assistance triggered the right.24 In these cases, however, the scope of the hearing right
is far less extensive than in the core areas of competition and anti-dumping law.25 The litigants
have the right to a brief description of the facts and reasoning supporting the contemplated
decision, to make their arguments and advance their evidence in a written submission, and
receive a brief and by no means exhaustive reply in the Commission's statement of reasons.
Notwithstanding this extension of procedural rights into areas where the Commission
imposes particularized hardship, the Court has been reluctant to do the same where the
in the context of that jurisprudence, the burden interpretation appears to be the correct one.
21
Case 264/82, Timex Corporation v. Council & Commission, 1985 ECR 849; Case C-49/88, Al-Jubail Fertilizer v.
Council, 1991 ECR I-3241, para. 15 (relying upon the right to a fair hearing and “equality of arms” in competition
area to establish the right to a fair hearing in the international trade domain). For the more recent cases defining the
scope of the right to a fair hearing, see Case T-88/98, Kundan Industries Ltd and Tata International Ltd v. Council,
2002 ECR ; Case T-121/95, EFMA v. Council 1997 ECR II-2391, para. 84; Case T-159/94 & T-160/94, Ajinomoto
and Nutrasweet v. Council, 1997 ECR II- 2461, para. 83; Case T-147/97, Champion Stationery v. Council, 1998
ECR II-4137, para. 55.
22
Case T-50/96, Primex Produkte v. Commission, 1998 ECR II-3773. The Court found that the importer had a
right of access to the Commission’s file and a right to respond, in writing, to the Commission’s allegations,
including the right to submit evidence. The Customs Code was amended to reflect the Court’s holding.
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1677/98 of 29 July 1998 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 laying down
provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs
Code, 1998 O.J. (L 212) 18 (Regulation 2454/93, art. 906A). In two pending cases, the Court has been presented
with the question of whether the right to be heard in the customs area also includes the right to submit oral
representations. Cases T-134/03 and T-135/03, Common Market Fertilizers v. Commission, 2003 O.J. (C 158) 24,
25.
23
Case C-135/92, Fiskano v. Commission, 1994 ECR I-2885; see also Case T-46/00, Kvitsjoen v Commission,
2000 ECR II-03713.
24
Case T-450/93, Lisrestal v. Commission, 1994 ECR II-1177.
25
Koen Lenaerts & Jan Vanhamme, Procedural Rights of Private Parties in the Community Administrative Process,
1997 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 531, 562-66. In U.S. administrative law, the distinction bears some resemblance to the
distinction between formal and informal adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act. However, because of
the evolution of procedural requirements in the context of informal adjudication and rulemaking, today those
requirements exceed anything existing in the Community outside of the core areas of competition proceedings.
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determination results in an individual benefit. On this issue Hauptzollamt Munchen-Mitte v.
Technische Universitat Munchen is still the Court's most authoritative statement.26 Technische
Universitat had applied for an exemption from the generally applicable customs duty, on the
grounds that an equivalent microscope (being imported from Japan) was not produced by any
European manufacturer and was to be used exclusively for scientific purposes. Technische
Universitat was not given the opportunity to explain the scientific uses of the microscope or the
inadequacy of existing European models. The Commission and comitology committee decided
against Technische Universitat and, in matter of fact, in favor of Philips, which claimed it
produced an equivalent microscope. The Court held that Technische Universitat had a right to
submit a written statement, but only because, in such cases "the importing institution is best
aware of the technical characteristics which the scientific apparatus must have in view of the
work for which it is intended," not because the decision determined how much--or how little-Technische Universitat would have to pay for the microscope. Thus, hearing rights in areas
where specific benefits are conferred are contingent upon the type of fact involved in the
decision and whether the interested party can contribute to the correct resolution of the fact. It is
by no means absolute.
The Court's ambivalence toward a minimal fair hearing right in areas where the
Commission confers specific benefits is inconsistent with national administrative law traditions.
In most systems, the dividing line for purposes of determining the scope of procedural
guarantees is not whether the administration confers a burden as opposed to a benefit but
whether the determination is an individual or a generalized one. 27 Individual acts are classically

26

Case C-269/90, Hauptzollamt Munchen-Mitte v. Technische Universitat Munchen, 1991 ECR I-5469, paras. 2325. In Hauptzollamt, the Court reversed its earlier position that the applicable customs legislation did not give rise
to a hearing right. See 203/85, Nicolet Instrument v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main, 1986 ECR 2049, para. 15
27
In German administrative law this category of administrative action is covered by the concept of by the
“Verwaltungsakt” (administrative act) and in French administrative law by “acte individuel.
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distinguished from general administrative acts because, given the similarity to judicial
determinations, basic fairness principles are thought to require, at the very least, a skeleton
description of the evidence and the proposed decision and a right to respond. Understandably,
the Court is reluctant to impose needless procedural hoops on the Commission because of the
consequences for cost and speed, yet, in light of existing standards in the member states, it is
going to be difficult for the Court to resist fair hearing rights where the Commission's
determination results in a specific benefit.

II. The Second Generation: The Right to Transparency
Transparency is a general duty applicable to all European institutions. Legislators and
government officials are to conduct their business as openly as possible, allowing the press and
members of the public to scrutinize their decisionmaking. As a legal right, transparency mainly
refers to the individual right of access to information. By allowing individuals to closely follow
the work of the institutions, including administrative decisionmaking, transparency enables
individuals, both through informal, political means and through formal, legal means, to exert
greater influence over legislative and administrative proceedings.
The history of transparency began in the early 1990’s with the Danish rejection of the
Maastricht Treaty and the attempt to dissipate popular distrust of Brussels through a series of
open government measures. These have largely been focused on the right of access to
government documents. Following the Inter-Institutional Declaration on Democracy,
Transparency, and Subsidiarity issued in 1993, the Council and Commission each adopted
decisions granting individuals a general right of access to their documents, subject to numerous
exceptions.28 In the first years of litigation under these decisions, the Court of First Instance
gave significant bite to the right of access by showing a willingness to narrowly interpret the

28

Decision 93/73/EC, Council Decision of 20 December 1993 on public access to Council documents, 1993 OJ
(L340) 43; 94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom: Commission Decision of 8 February 1994 on public access to Commission
documents, 1994 OJ (L 46)) 58.
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exceptions 29 and by requiring, when an exception was justified, that access be denied line-byline, redacting if necessary, rather than through blanket exclusions of entire documents or sets of
documents.30 This was followed, in the Treaty of Amsterdam, by the important inclusion of a
“right of access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents,”31 by the
guarantee of a "right of access to documents” in the Charter on Fundamental Rights,32 and,
finally, after a long, bitter set of negotiations, in the Regulation on public access to documents of
all three institutions.33
The impetus toward transparency continues, with considerable force, in the draft
Constitution. The new article on transparency would constitutionalize the current practice of
requiring all committees and agencies, in addition to the Commission, Parliament, and Council,
to respect access to document rights.34 It would also go beyond access to documents and make
explicit what now is only implicit, namely that European bodies are under a duty to "conduct
their work as openly as possible."35 Moreover, the new article would require both the Parliament
and the Council to meet in public when considering and adopting legislative measures. Lastly,
Parliament and the Council would be required to publish documents related to their deliberations
on legislative matters, documents which at present can be obtained only through access to
29

Case T-194/94, John Carvel & Guardian Newspapers v. Council, 1995 ECR II-2765; Case T-309/97, The
Bavarian Lager Co. Commission, 1999 ECR II-3217.
30
Case T-14/98, Heidi Hautala v. Council, 1999 ECR II-2489; Case T-124/96 Interporc v. Commission, 1998 ECR
II-231.
31
TEC, art. 255.
32
Charter on Fundamental Rights, art 42.
33
Regulation No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 43.
34
See, e.g., Regulation No. 1641/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2003 amending
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1210/90 on the establishment of the European Environment Agency and the
European Environment Information and Observation Network.
35
Draft Constitution, art. I-49
36
Draft Constitution, art. III-301.2.
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information requests and hence are not widely distributed and are not available on a timely
basis.36
This phase in the development of participation rights was led by certain member states
and the European Parliament, not the Court, and responsibility for developing and expanding
transparency guarantees continues to lie primarily with political, as opposed to judicial,
institutions.37 The Nordic countries and the Netherlands have longstanding traditions of freedom
of the press, public disclosure, and access to government documents. Both the Dutch and the
Swedish constitutions guarantee access to government information. The expectation that
government officials are to openly interact with the public and members of parliament has
shaped the way in which diplomats and bureaucrats from these member states have exercised
their authority within the Community system and, combined with the events of Maastricht, has
led to the improvement of transparency in a variety of institutional practices.38
The European Parliament has also been an advocate of transparency.39 In part, this bias
is natural for an elected body: parliamentary debates, votes, and committee work are open to the
public so that constituents can hold their representatives accountable. For the European
Parliament, transparency assumed particular significance because it was a means of improving

37

D.M. Curtin, Betwixt and Between: Democracy and Transparency in the Governance of the European Union, in
Reforming the Treaty on European Union: The Legal Debate 95 (Jan A. Winter et al. eds., 1995)
38
An anecdote from my research on European data protection policy illustrates the impact of the Swedish accession
on transparency. It is common practice for the Council, when adopting legislative proposals, to enter declarations,
some common to both the Council and the Commission, others by individual member states, as to the interpretation
of certain provisions of the legislative proposal. When the Data Protection Directive was adopted in 1995, the
Danish and Swedish representatives requested that these declarations be made public and, when they were opposed
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what, just over a decade ago, were still quite meager institutional powers. Knowing what was
happening in the Commission or the Council, was a means of expanding Parliament's influence.
For instance, the inter-institutional agreements on a form of administration known as comitology,
agreements between the Parliament and Council and the Parliament and the Commission, which
ultimately led to a new framework decision for comitology procedures, were all designed to
improve Parliament's control over executive decisionmaking but also had the effect of rendering
comitology more transparent to the public at large.40
The jury is still out on the effectiveness of the public access guarantees in enabling
individuals to influence ongoing policymaking initiatives. In the United States, the Freedom of
Information Act has been used not only as a general accountability tool but also as a means of
obtaining information about specific administrative proceedings. Whether access rights will be
used in the latter fashion, will depend on the interpretation of the exceptions as well as the speed
with which the institutions respond to requests. In theory, the establishment of a register under
the Regulation should allow individuals to follow all proceedings, administrative and
otherwise.41 The Regulation’s exception, however, for documents antecedent to final decisions
might very well prevent such use of access rights:
Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by
an institution, which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken by
the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously
undermine the institution’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding
public interest in disclosure.42
40

See Commission’s Undertaking of 26 September 1996; Budget Resolution of October 1996; Modus Vivendi,
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experience to date with the Regulation, see Magdalena Elisabeth de Leeuw, The Regulation on the Public Access to
European Parliament, Council, and Commission Documents in the European Union: Are Citizens Better Off? 28
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Moreover, the exception for privacy rights could very well exempt documents in
proceedings where specific individuals are consulted, which would put another gaping
hole in the access right. Lastly and most critically, an effective right of access will
depend on the resources which the Council and Commission choose to dedicate to the
subject. Without good record-keeping, registration, and archiving practices in each and
every department and without a corps of administrators dedicated to responding, in a
timely fashion, to public access requests, the right will be chimerical. Thus, even though
the Court and the Ombudsman will undoubtedly contribute to the vigorous enforcement
of access rights, only a willingness on the part of the member states and the institutions to
commit significant resources will make it a reality.
The transparency principle not only guarantees the right of individuals to demand
documents but also informs government practices making documents freely available. Where
the new commitment to transparency has affected the Commission most is precisely in the
administrative arena. Traditionally, in the Commission, only important policy initiatives were
made public through White Paper and Green Papers. Now certain committees of national
representatives and certain divisions within the Commission have begun making the more
mundane activity of interpreting, implementing, and updating existing legislative frameworks
more transparent. The examples I have in mind are financial services, data protection, and
telecommunications.43 Recently, the Commission, on its own initiative or functioning as the
secretariat for the committees of national regulators, has begun placing the committees’ work
agendas and draft proposals on its website.44 This constitutes a dramatic shift from the past,
43
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when rulemaking powers exercised outside of the formal legislative process of White Paper and
Commission proposal were shielded from the public eye and therefore implementing rules or
informal guidelines could appear in the Official Journal as a surprise to the interested
community, a fait accompli. This type of continuous transparency, more so that formal access
rights, enables interested parties to make their views know to the Commission and national
regulators and thus actively shape the course of Community administration.

III. The Third Generation: The Right to Participation in Legislative and Administrative
Policymaking?
1. The role of civil society in European governance
The third, and most recent phase in the development of Community procedural rights
began in the late 1990’s.45 This is the question of whether associations, individual citizens and
firms, so-called “civil society” should be directly involved in the work of the institutions.46 Of
course, these actors have always shaped politics in the European Parliament and the Council,
through the national politics of elections, parties, and interest groups. Moreover, their lobbyists
have been a long-standing feature of Bruxellois topography. The difference, noticeable in the
change of terminology from “pressure group” to “civil society organization,” is that now there is
a call from certain quarters to consider them legitimate partners in European governance.
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Many perceive consultation as a variant of transparency, but, as should be clear, I see the two as distinct.
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As Stijn Smismans has persuasively argued, the Commission has been the most vigorous
institutional promoter of governance by civil society.47 Civil society discourse has served two
distinct institutional interests: it has supported the expansion of the Commission’s jurisdictional
mandate and it has served as a defense against charges that the Commission is an unaccountable
executive body, removed from the popular will. Since non-profits like religious organizations,
charities, and so on benefit from the Commission's funding in the social arena, they are natural
allies in the bid to move beyond the core common market areas, and bring welfare, immigrant
rights, unemployment, and other social policies under the EU umbrella. Moreover, the civil
society connection adds an element of democratic legitimacy to the Commission, therefore
justifying both the advancement of European integration and safeguarding the Commission’s
legislative and other prerogatives.
The exact shape of governance through civil society is still uncertain and hotly contested.
The Commission’s most recent statement is contained in its Communication on consultation of
December 2002, which supplements the White Paper on governance of June 2001. The
participation envisaged by the Commission will take two forms. First, the Commission will
consult civil society on major legislative proposals by publishing a description of the specific
issues open for discussion on its website, publishing the civil society responses on its website,
and summarizing the responses as well as the ways in which they did or did not alter the
Commission’s legislative proposal in an explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal.48
The Commission will also actively solicit the opinions of certain “target groups,” namely those
who will be affected by the policy, will be involved in implementation of the policy, or whose
organizational mission is directly related to the policy. The choice among the different views is
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a “political decision” for the Commission alone to make.49 These minimum standards are meant
to guide the practices of Commission officials but, importantly, do not constitute binding legal
duties enforceable in judicial proceedings.50 Moreover, the Commission makes it clear that the
Communication contains only minimum standards and it might, or national committees of
regulators might, choose to consult on more specific matters which would fall within the ambit
of administrative rulemaking.51
Second, in what the Commission calls “co-regulation”, associations will take on
responsibility for implementing basic legislation by developing standards and codes of conduct,
under the loose supervision of the Commission and committees.52 Co-regulation is generally not
recognized as a form of civil society participation in European governance because it is not
thought to be governance at all: the issues which are delegated to associations are conceived as
narrow matters which only concern and affect certain firms and therefore their associations are
the best-placed, because of their experience and interest in the area, to set down the applicable
rules.53 The reality, however, is that this form of industry self-regulation constitutes
policymaking with a real impact on individuals and firms outside of any particular industry
association. In my view, therefore, co-regulation is an extreme—and potentially lopsided-- form
of civil society participation in governance. This category covers the work of the standardization
committees under the rubric of the "New Approach" harmonization directives and codes of
conduct adopted by industry associations. In sum, there are two ways in which civil society is
called upon to participate in European governance: the Commission can decide to retain public
authority but call for the views of civil society more thoroughly and systematically than it ever
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did in the past, or the Commission can transfer public authority to civil society organizations but
loosely supervise their activities.
Let me illustrate with two specific examples from the data protection area. First, the
committee charged with overseeing implementation of the Data Protection Directive has
undertaken to systematically consult interested parties. In November 2002, the Working Party
on Data Protection announced that it would not only make its draft measures available to the
public before reaching final decisions but that it would also engage in consultations with
interested parties based on draft documents, a series of questions, or an indication of a future
problem to be addressed. According to the statement, consultations will be announced on the
website as well as through mailings to certain European-level associations. They will be
conducted at the discretion of the Working Party and are expected to occur a couple of times
each year. It is clear that the recent debate on civil society participation has already had an
impact on this small nook of the Community’s administrative culture.
Second, the Data Protection Directive passed in 1995 makes use of co-regulation
through "codes of conduct." It provides that:
The Member States and the Commission shall encourage the drawing up of codes
of conduct intended to contribute to the proper implementation of the national
provisions adopted by the Member States pursuant to this Directive, taking
account of the specific features of the various sectors.
Art. 27.1. The Directive thus attempts to enlist trade associations and other bodies which
represent firms that handle personal data to formulate the specific rules that guarantee the basic
data rights established under the Directive, namely the fair, legitimate, proportionate, and secure
collection, processing, and communication of individuals' personal information. One may speak
of co-regulation as opposed to self-regulation in that the Directive foresees a role for public
authorities in reviewing the standards:
Draft Community codes, and amendments or extensions to existing Community
codes, may be submitted to the Working Party. The Working Party shall
determine, among other things, whether the drafts submitted to it are in
accordance with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive. If it
sees fit, the authority shall seek the view of data subjects or their representatives.
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The Commission may ensure appropriate publicity for the codes which have been
approved by the Working Party.
Art. 27.3.
In June 2003, the first code of conduct, drafted by the European Direct Marketing
Association (FEDMA), was approved by the Working Party.54 The Commission has also
received proposed codes from both the European association of headhunters (AESC) and the
European association of caller identification firms (ETP). Furthermore, in early 2003, the
Confederation of British Industry together with the International Chamber of Commerce
proposed a set of model contract clauses for data transfers abroad. Although, strictly speaking,
these model clauses are not codes of conduct, the process through which the model contract
clauses were generated--through consultation of the respective organizations’ members-- and the
subsequent review by the Commission and the comitology committee are roughly analogous.

2. The justifications for civil society participation
The prevailing institutional reasons for the participation of civil society in policymaking
are problematic because they obscure the real value choices that will have to be made by the
Commission and committees in determining, when conducting consultations, whom to consult
and which comments to accept or reject and, when reviewing industry standards and codes of
conduct, whether or not to approve them in light of the applicable legislation. What is the
rationale for entrenching civil society participation in Community policymaking? After all, the
good government reforms could have stopped with transparency and could have left
associational influence to existing political and legal processes. Three distinct discourses on the
legitimacy of policymaking through civil society are evident from the Commission's
communications: technocratic expertise, the Commission as firm engaged in good management
practices to improve its brand name among European citizens, and the representation of interests
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and values.55 As I argue below, the first two discourses mask the realities of the participation of
individuals, firms, and their associations and therefore run the danger of obscuring, both to
public decisionmakers as well as to civil society itself, the real dynamics of risk allocation and
resources distribution. Only representation withstands scrutiny but given the radical
disagreement in Europe on representation outside of the electoral process through interest
groups, it cannot support the emerging Brussels consensus on governance with civil society.
In the White Paper on Governance, the Commission advanced a technocratic and
functional vision of its role in European governance. Essentially, it combined conventional
national theories on constitutional government, mechanically transposed to the supranational
level, with the functionalist ethos which persists in the mentality of Europe's civil servants. As
the Commission saw it, the Council and European Parliament should make law and the
Commission should implement it. The Council and Parliament would represent citizens and hold
the executive branch, i.e. the Commission, accountable, the Commission would make expert and
scientific judgments necessary to carry out the legislative will.56
This technocratic and functionalist logic also pervaded the Commission's depiction of its
relationship with civil society. Among the five principles of good governance identified by the
Commission at the outset of the paper--openness, accountability, effectiveness, coherence, and
participation--only the definition of participation appears to encompass the Commission's
interaction with civil society organizations. It reads as follows:
Participation. The quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on
ensuring wide participation throughout the policy chain--from conception to
implementation. Improved participation is likely to create more confidence in the
end result and in the Institutions which deliver policies. Participation crucially
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depends on central governments following an inclusive approach when
developing and implementing EU policies.57
Two very powerful strands in the institutional discourse on civil society participation
emerge from this passage. First, participation is valuable because it contributes
knowledge and expertise and thus makes for better policy. The expertise rationale is
particularly powerful in the discussion of when co-regulation is appropriate:
Co-regulation combines binding legislative and regulatory action with
actions taken by the actors most concerned, drawing on their practical
expertise. The result is wider ownership of the policies in question by
involving those most affected by implementing rules in their preparation
and enforcement. This often achieves better compliance.58
Second, participation is a good management practice. It is about managing the "policy
chain" and giving the Commission’s consumer, the European citizen, what she wants,
thus creating brand loyalty or "confidence." This functionalist rationale, infused with
contemporary management consultant jargon, appears throughout the paper:
[NGO's] act as an early warning system for the direction of political debate.59
Or:
Civil society increasingly sees Europe as offering a good platform to change
policy orientations and society. This offers a real potential to broaden the debate
on Europe’s role. It is a chance to get citizens more actively involved in
achieving the Union’s objectives and to offer them a structured channel for
feedback, criticism and protest.60
Or again:
Participation is not about institutionalising protest. It is about more effective
policy shaping based on early consultation and past experience.61
Both of these strands are problematic because they create the illusion that, in deciding
which associations should be consulted and whose suggestions should be accepted, or in
deciding which associational codes of conduct should pass muster, value judgments are not
made. The public good is not crafted by the Commission and the interests and associations to
57
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whom it listens. These depictions of civil society governance paint a civic world in which public
authority can somehow operate without conferring benefits and inflicting costs, excluding some
groups and including others, and creating political winners and losers. In the technocracy
narrative, when a choice is made to consult on a particular issue, to consult only certain groups,
or to accept comments from some over the objections of others, it is because of the objective
nature of the policy problem. Public servants select areas for consultation by defining them as
technical problems in need of information. They ask certain organizations for comments and
accept their suggestions because those organizations have the necessary resources, expertise, and
knowledge. I certainly do not deny that expertise and science have a legitimate place in
policymaking, but applied to interest groups the concepts are problematic because they mask the
use of knowledge to frame problems, represent partial world views and shape political agendas.62
The management narrative also obscures the value choices made by public authorities: it
denies altogether the existence of different and conflicting information, interests, and world
views. It represents a curious extension of the scientific management rationale for
administration, widespread both in Europe and America in the 1950's and 1960's, from the
socioeconomic problems to be fixed to the public process through which the problems are
defined. In the traditional understanding of the administrative state, bureaucrats use their
specialized knowledge and experience to manage the market and promote public well-being but,
at a very general level, they do so under the direction of the legislature and the public interest
goals contained in democratically enacted statutes.63 In the Commission's rhetoric, the public
interest itself can be ascertained through good management practices, by ensuring that the right
systems are in place to allow interest groups to signal the direction of political debate, give
feedback, and effectively shape policy.
61
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Only the third reason for governance with civil society--representation--can justify the
exercise of public authority with, as in the case of entrenched consultation rights, or through, as
in the case of co-regulation, civil society organizations. In the age of European consensus on
representative democracy, the only plausible justification for allocating public power to
individuals, firms, and private associations is the claim that they represent the wider body of
citizens who will have to obey public decisions. While the White Paper was quite shy on this
point, the recent Commission Communication frankly bills civil society consultation a
“supplement” to parliamentary processes and states that “the guiding principle for the
Commission is therefore to give interested parties a voice, but not a vote.”64 The Commission
certainly has not abandoned the expertise or brand loyalty rationales:
By fulfilling its duty to consult, the Commission ensures that its proposals are
technically viable, practically workable and based on a bottom-up approach. In
other words, good consultation serves a dual purpose by helping to improve the
quality of the policy outcome and at the same time enhancing the involvement of
interested parties and the public at large.65
However representation, both in ensuring a “proper balance”66 among different interests in the
consultation process, and in considering “how representative views are when taking a political
decision following a consultation process”67 is central to the document.

3. Representation through civil society associations
Representation through elected representatives, through political parties, through trade
unions and employer organizations, and now through "civil society organizations" has always
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been fraught with difficulty in political theory. 68 Conceptions of certain types of representation
as legitimate, others illegitimate, as fostering civic virtue and a vigorous res publica or leading to
the demise of the polity and the soul, change across time and place. The one constant, however,
is that representation is socially constructed. Thus, to return to the civil society debate,
representation of civil society in Brussels cannot be conceived as the mechanical reflection of
interest or value; it is the definition of interest and value and the ability to command adherence to
that definition.
The proponents of civil society, both in the EU and in other international organizations,
often betray a naturalistic conception of civil society. Existing civil society organizations and, if
all goes well, public decisionmaking, merely reflect an underlying, primordial civil society. In
the current attempt to draw on associations to legitimate international organizations, lawmakers,
commentators, and the associations themselves portray individuals as naturally organizing
themselves into associations based on value from a pre- industrial age, values like family,
religion, or local community, reminiscent of Durkheim's solidarity by similarity, or based on the
functional interests of industrial and post-industrial economies, interests such as work and
consumerism, reminiscent of Durkheim's solidarity by difference. This harks back to the ordoliberal economic agenda of the original European Community and contains many of the same
pitfalls. It is plausible, just barely, to say that market actors can and should operate in a sphere
devoid of public power, in which their sole motivation is to maximize profit, defined in strictly
economic terms, and in which the costs and benefits faced by market actors are the natural costs
and benefits generated by certain uses of resources. It is entirely implausible to say that an
association, whose very purpose is, regardless of its type, to exercise authority over its members,
somehow exists independently of the body which is defined as possessing a monopoly of
authority, namely the state. As long as there has been some form of public authority-- the polis,
the Republic, the Emperor, the king, or the nineteenth-century nation state--claims to
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representation have been constructed through the dialectic of established, and contending,
discourses of legitimacy, power holders and power challengers, new and old forms of wealth and
status.
The results of the Commission’s consultation on consultation is proof enough that neither
civil society nor representation of civil society is natural. If the Durkheimian understanding of
civil society were correct, one would expect to find roughly the same associational life in all of
the member states and the same interest and value organizations present both at the European
level and at the national level. Furthermore, one would expect that civil society organizations
would extensively mobilize on an issue so vital to them. Look, then, at who answered the
Commission’s consultation paper. The national organizations were overwhelmingly British,
with a few German and Swedish appearances, and overwhelmingly employer groups. Among
the European-wide organizations there were employers and professional federations—but not the
European Trade Union Congress—the principal consumers group, a couple of environmental
groups, four social sector groups, one family organization federation, and one citizens rights
group. It is not idle speculation to hypothesize that the results reflect different traditions of
interest representation identified by comparativists: British employers are organized into
pluralist sector-specific associations, the Swedish and the Germans into corporatist peak
organizations, and the Mediterraneans into less powerful associations without the resources or
inclination to respond to the Commission's consultation paper.
The point is not that an idea of representation of interest and value through associations
should be rejected. Rather, it is that this type of representation, like all others, is socially
constructed, but unlike representation through political parties and elected representatives, it
does not enjoy anything approaching a "European" conceptual consensus. Certain strains of the
Enlightenment republican tradition deny that particularized interests and their associations can
ever create a stable, prosperous, and virtuous res publica.69 The corporatist tradition, by
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contrast, does allow a role for associations in exercising public authority, but only those which
are believed to embody economic and social realities writ large. These realities might be the
familiar Marxist, now social democratic, categories of labor and capital, but in some places can
include rural interests, ethnic groups or regional identities. The liberal tradition is the only one
which embraces all forms of associational life as legitimate representation of interest and which
sees the possibility of a single body politic through interest group competition.70
For the Commission to choose among these, paradoxically, would defy rather than affirm
the European idea of representation.71 The Commission is too removed, in its institutional
composition, from ideals of representative democracy to choose, on the behalf of Europe, among
these different traditions. To some extent, the Commission in promoting "civil society" has
already rejected a strongly republican conception of the body politic and an institutional role
defined purely as power broker among sovereign states. Whether associational life will be
pluralist or corporatist, however, has not yet been decided. The Commission communication,
importantly, does not create a legal right of participation, one element of a pluralist order.72 In
saying that the Commission does not wish to create "bureaucratic" hurdles to the participation of
some organizations in consultation proceedings, yet also stating that an organization's influence
will sometimes depend on its "representativeness," the Commission reveals a deep ambivalence
on the question of pluralism or corporatism.
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Not only would a right to a certain form of interest group participation be democratically
problematic, but it would inevitably privilege certain groups, issues, and national political
traditions. To illustrate, take the longstanding difference between the English and continental
labor movements: English unions tend to be organized along craft lines, continental ones along
industry lines. Simplifying grossly, English workers tend to identify with their trades and thus a
train driver defines himself as a train driver, with all of the wage differentials and privileges
which attach, whereas on the Continent, a train driver defines himself as a blue collar worker in
the railway industry, without the wage differentials but with the social benefits that come from
the bargaining power of a union which represents all workers in the industry. The choice of
pluralism is the choice of a concept of interest as train driver, not as blue collar worker. Or take
an example closer to the everyday work of the Commission. Is being a consumer about
believing that all consumers should have access to basic goods of decent quality, as in Sweden,
or is it about believing that consumers should have the broadest choice possible, as in other
countries? The answer to this question influences everything from broad spending and policy
priorities to more narrow questions of, say, the scope of universal services obligations in
telecommunications.
Furthermore, if the Commission were to adopt a liberal pluralist conception of civil
society, it would take on an extreme form which exists nowhere else. Even in the United States,
where the faith in pluralist interest group representation is perhaps the strongest among Western
traditions, elected representatives are charged with mediating among interest groups. The
Madisonian apotheosis of passion and interest into republican virtue occurs not simply through
the checking of interest against interest, but through the institutional balance of strong electoral
bodies. The Commission might be a powerful institution under the Treaty legislative process but
in other respects it is weak: it has few resources, material or moral, to allow it to stand above the
pluralist interest group fray. The Commission does not have the economists or other experts on
staff to examine the claims made by interested associations. Indeed a large part of the charm of
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consultation and codes of conduct is that the Commission can obtain expert information about
different policy problems and thus extend the reach of European harmonization without needing
the financial resources of a true, federal executive branch. Neither does the Commission have
the moral resources to withstand interest group pressure. Its policy choices are never supported
or rejected by a popular vote or a general strike or even a demonstration. The Commission is an
executive branch in the parliamentary tradition, with a very powerful role in the legislative
process through the right of initiation, but its links to majoritarian politics are tenuous at best.
The members of the Commission are not chosen through direct elections, or through
parliamentary elections, rather they are nominated for a five-year term by national governments
and then approved by the European Parliament. Removal can occur, but only under exceptional
circumstances. The extent to which the Commission depends upon interest groups, rather than
the ballot box and electoral politics, in undertaking new policy initiatives and fulfilling its role as
policy entrepreneur creates a bias in favor of pluralism.

4. The draft Constitution
The Convention on the Future of Europe expanded the role envisioned for civil society
organizations in public decisionmaking. The drafters of the proposed Constitution identified two
forms of citizenship and democratic governance in contemporary public life and enshrined both
in the Constitution. The first is "representative democracy" and encompasses elections, political
parties, government by elected officials, open decisionmaking, and local decisionmaking
wherever possible (or, in European parlance, subsidiarity).73 The second is "participatory
democracy" and refers to the involvement of civil society in day-to-day government
decisionmaking as well as a citizens’ initiative in which one million or more citizens may
request--but not require--the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal.
The provisions most relevant to this discussion, those on direct participation by civil
society, are as follows:
73

Draft Constitution, art. 45.
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Article 46: The principle of participatory democracy
1. The Union Institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and
representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange
their views on all areas of Union action.
2. The Union Institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue
with representative associations and civil society.
3. The Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in
order to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and transparent.
....
This principle must be read together with an earlier provision on democratic equality:
Article 44: The principle of democratic equality
In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of
citizens. All shall receive equal attention from the Union's Institutions.
Together, these two provisions would create a broader right of participation than
previously recognized in the Commission's statements. In its current form, the Constitution
would require not only the Commission, but the European Parliament, the European Council, the
Council of Ministers, and the Court of Justice, that is all of those institutions identified earlier as
part of the Union's institutional framework, to allow individuals and associations to comment on
their initiatives.74 The Commission's duties are set out more precisely: it would be required to
carry out consultations with concerned parties, which would likely be interpreted to imply a
systematic process of the type outlined in the Commission Communication. Moreover, such
consultations would not be confined to major legislative proposals but would be required
whenever necessary to ensure that government action is "coherent and transparent." The draft
Constitution is highly ambiguous on the question of whether the Commission and other
institutions, once they have engaged in the dialogue, are then obliged to treat all associational
views as equally legitimate in the pluralist tradition or whether they may give certain interests
74

Draft Constitution, art. 18. Especially in the case of the Court of Justice, this duty is perplexing since, as a court,
its legitimacy has traditionally rested with the neutral and impartial interpretation of the law, unswayed by politics.
Does it mean that the Court should allow for amicus curiae briefs, that it should allow the public to comment on
opinions of the Advocate General before judgments are handed down, that it should institute a mechanism for
accepting public views on its decisions, or that it should accept comments on its annual report?
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more weight than others. On the one hand, under the principle of democratic equality, all groups
and citizens will, in theory, be able to demand "equal attention" from the institutions. On the
other hand, the principle of participatory democracy requires that associations be
“representative.”
It is difficult to anticipate the direction that the Court of Justice will take. The right to
participatory democracy, however, is phrased so broadly that it should not interpreted as grounds
for review of European legislation and administrative acts. 75 Article 46 is similar to other,
programmatic, provisions of the Treaty, which are binding on the institutions but do not
constitute legal grounds for challenging public decisions.76 In other words, failure to comply
with the requirements of participatory democracy should not constitute infringement of an
"essential procedural requirement" or an "infringement of the Constitution" under Art. III-266
(currently Art. 230) which an individual could raise as a defense to any European legislative or
regulatory measure.
This interpretation of Article 46 would also be the one most consistent with national
traditions of associational participation. The UK is probably the member state with the broadest
consultation rights. One of the modernization initiatives of the Blair government has been to
require government departments to consult with the public when they draft legislation or major
pieces of delegated legislation, i.e. statutory instruments.77 As a general rule, government
departments must allow twelve weeks for comment, synthesize and summarize those comments
for public consumption, and then explain the policy choices ultimately made. However, these
are just Cabinet Office guidelines, namely they do not create binding legal duties and they vest a
significant amount of discretion concerning when and how to consult with administrators. Other
75

In line with the existing Treaties and practice, the draft Constitution gives the Court of Justice the power to review
European legislative and administrative acts for consistency with the Constitution: it "shall ensure respect for the
law in the interpretation and application of the Constitution." Art. 28. Since such measures are not treated as
directly and individually affecting individuals for purposes of primary jurisdiction in the Court of Justice, such a
claim would be made in domestic court and the question would then be referred to the Court of Justice. .
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On the distinction between programmatic provisions and other Treaty provisions, see Cases C-72/91 and 73/91,
Firma Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG v. Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer, 1993 ECR I-887, para. 23 to 29.
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See Cabinet Office, Code of Practice on Written Consultation (Nov. 2000), available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/regulation/Consultation/Code.htm.
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European countries have given citizens and their associations the right to participate in certain
types of rulemaking proceedings where the outcome is believed to have concrete effects on
discrete groups of citizens. Land use planning at the municipal and regional levels is generally
subject to disclosure and public debate requirements.78 Government actions which might have
an impact on the environment must, through the device of the environmental impact statement,
be open to public debate before the adoption of the measure.79 Legally binding consultation
rights exist but they have been established one area at time, when the political process has
recognized that the issues and the stakes particular to that area require greater interest group
involvement than generally is the case in administrative decisionmaking.80
The Convention on the Future of Europe also took a stronger position than the
Commission on the democratic justification for government by civil society. While the
Commission, at the most, claimed that consultation was to "supplement" parliamentary
processes, the draft Constitution enthusiastically embraces civil society participation as equal to,
or, indeed, in some respects superior to electoral politics. It dedicates one article to the
institutions of electoral politics and another to the involvement of civil society through
consultation, legislative initiatives, and other mechanisms. Significantly, elections and
parliaments are believed to guarantee the "principle of representative democracy," whereas civil
society politics are thought to guarantee the "principle of participatory democracy." This
formulation associates elections and legislative bodies with passive citizenship and the
routinization of politics, and identifies interest group consultation with active citizen engagement
and direct democracy. The political community can operate through two modes, either
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For Italy, see Aldo Sandulli, Il Procedimento, in 2 Diritto Amministrativo Generale 927 (Sabino Cassese et al.
eds., 2000). For France, see Jean-Marie Pontier, La démocratie de proximité: les citoyens, les élus locaux et les
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85/337/EEC, 1985 O.J. L 175 (40).
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Even in the United States, where the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) creates the functional equivalent of a
consultation duty and that duty is enforceable in court, the coverage is limited: the APA express excludes many
types of administrative rules as well as certain areas such as foreign affairs.
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"representative democracy," meaning the periodic expression of preference in elections and the
routine workings of legislative bodies, or "participatory democracy," meaning the daily
engagement of citizens and their associations in directing the course of the body politic. The use
of labels betrays a certain dissatisfaction with electoral politics, perhaps because it is still heavily
dependent on national identities and therefore has not yet truly come to life in the European
arena, perhaps because domestic elections have not always resulted in ringing support for
European integration, or perhaps because electoral politics is weighed down by what some
perceive as obsolete party machinery. And the use of labels reflects considerable faith in civil
society participation to transform what is still understood by many as an international
organization--a convenient mode of cooperation among nations--into a political community.
The problem is that the virtues of participation and active citizenship cannot be claimed
by any particular set of public institutions or political processes. Thus a national election
campaign can be more participatory than the publication of a new Commission initiative on
consumer protection, which neither the local consumer group nor the individual consumer has
time to look at. Likewise, representation, and all the consequences, positive and negative that
flow from that idea, are not confined to legislative politics but are equally applicable to civil
society politics. In a political entity numbering over 370 million people, the idea that, whenever
the Commission or another European institution engages in public decisionmaking, all parties
concerned, all interested citizens will be able to express their "views" and engage in "dialogue" is
manifestly impossible. Some, of course, will engage in the dialogue and then the question
becomes whether they should be heard, or in other words, be allowed to influence policy
outcomes, a question which, in a democracy, will turn on representation.

Conclusion
Interest groups and lobbyists are a staple in Brussels and therefore civil society, in some
incarnation, will inevitably shape the Commission's policymaking. I am certainly not arguing for
a Jacobean clamp down on private associational life in European governance. I am arguing that
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the right to transparency, if supported by adequate resources, is highly significant and that, for
the moment, transparency alone can guarantee good government in Brussels. I am also
advocating self-awareness among administrators in seeing associational views for what they are,
explaining their value choices honestly, and appreciating their bias towards interest group
pluralism. Finally, I am arguing against a right to consultation in European policymaking. To
do so would be to impose a liberal pluralist vision of representation and the polity which is not,
or at least not yet, truly European.
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